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Abstract
Determining the intentionality of primate communication is critical to understanding the evolution of human language.
Although intentional signalling has been claimed for some great ape gestural signals, comparable evidence is currently
lacking for their vocal signals. We presented wild chimpanzees with a python model and found that two of three alarm call
types exhibited characteristics previously used to argue for intentionality in gestural communication. These alarm calls were:
(i) socially directed and given to the arrival of friends, (ii) associated with visual monitoring of the audience and gaze
alternations, and (iii) goal directed, as calling only stopped when recipients were safe from the predator. Our results
demonstrate that certain vocalisations of our closest living relatives qualify as intentional signals, in a directly comparable
way to many great ape gestures. We conclude that our results undermine a central argument of gestural theories of
language evolution and instead support a multimodal origin of human language.
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Introduction
Understanding the evolutionary origins of language, one of
humankind’s defining features, is a challenge that attracts
considerable multidisciplinary research effort. One important line
of evidence comes from comparative research on closely related
species, which enables us to identify elements of language that are
unique to the human lineage and elements that are shared with
our primate relatives and that were therefore likely present in our
common ancestors [1]. One critical and defining feature of
language is that it is produced intentionally, however the
evolutionary routes of this facet of language remain a matter of
fierce debate.
Intentionality is a concept that is discussed across disciplines
from philosophy to psychology but a cross-disciplinary consensus
on a definition for intentionality and how to identify it remains
elusive. One valuable scheme for considering the degree of
intentionality underlying behaviour is provided by Dennett [2]
and his different levels of intentionality can be usefully applied to
the communicative behaviour of animals [3,4]. Zero-order
intentionality attributes no mentality to the individual and it is
assumed their behaviour is a product of relatively automatic,
reflexive processes (e.g. an animal produces alarm calls because it
is frightened). First-order intentionality attributes beliefs and
desires to the behaving individual, including a desire to modify
or influence the behaviour of others (e.g. an animal produces
alarm calls to get others to move away from a predator). At this
level, although individuals may recognise the effect of their signals
on another’s behaviour, they crucially need no understanding of
the mind of the other individual. Second-order intentionality
requires an individual to have an understanding of both their own
and others’ mental states and for their behaviour to reflect a desire
to modify another’s mental state, not just their behaviour (e.g. an
animal produces alarm calls to inform an ignorant individual of a
predator and thus change their knowledge state). Grice [5] argues
that intentional communication requires both the signaller and
receiver to take into account each other’s mental states and thus
true communication requires a minimum of second order
intentionality. Whilst human language requires second order
intentionality or above, the level of intentionality inherent in the
production of communicative signals in our primate cousins
remains unclear.
Only a small number of studies have attempted to test whether
primates produce their communicative signals to modify the
mental states of others (second-order intentionality). In an early
study macaque monkeys failed to modulate their calling behaviour
in accordance with the ignorance or knowledge states of their
offspring about either a danger or a food source [6], and this is in
keeping with the generally poor performance of monkey species on
theory of mind tests [4,7]. In contrast, there is now evidence
indicating that our closest living relatives can understand
knowledge/ignorance states of others [8,9], but the extent to
which these skills influence signal production is still unclear. In one
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recent field study, wild chimpanzees produced alert hoos in
response to a predator model at different rates depending on the
presumed knowledge level of receivers [10]. Chimpanzees were
presented with static snake models and the effect of both the
caller’s and the receiver’s previous knowledge of the snake
(ignorant, partial knowledge, full knowledge) on call production
was examined. Although more calls were given when receivers
were ignorant, in these cases the callers were also previously
ignorant of the snake, so receiver knowledge was confounded with
caller knowledge. The elevated call rate in these cases may
therefore have simply reflected fear in the caller as they discovered
the predator (zero-order intentionality). The critical analysis in this
study was therefore one that showed that knowledgeable
chimpanzees called more to receivers who had heard alert calls
but not seen the snake (partially knowledgeable) compared to those
who had seen the snake (knowledgeable). In this analysis, however,
only a small subset of data was used where there was always a
chimpanzee approaching the snake. An alternative explanation for
these results is that calling was mediated by the behaviour of the
chimpanzee approaching the snake, rather than their knowledge
state. Individuals with less knowledge may have approached the
snake with inappropriate speed or confidence and this incongruent
behaviour may have been alarming in itself to the potential caller,
triggering production of calls (zero order intentionality). Indeed,
chimpanzees have been previously documented to produce fear
responses to group members behaving in unusual or inappropriate
ways (e.g. movement of individuals partially paralysed by polio
[11]) and this alternative explanation for these results remains to
be empirically tested. Thus, currently it seems premature to
conclude that chimpanzee calling behaviour is mediated by an
understanding of receiver mental states (second order intention-
ality), when lower level explanations have not been convincingly
excluded.
Whilst there is currently no unequivocal evidence for second
order intentionality in primate signal production, the question of
whether primates even demonstrate first order intentionality
during signal production is still a matter of debate [12].
Distinguishing between inflexible, automatic signal production
elicited in a reflexive manner by specific stimuli (zero order
intentionality) and voluntary signal production directed at a
recipient to change their behaviour (first order intentionality) is
important as first order intentionality is a necessary prerequisite for
second order intentionality and ‘true’ communication [5].
Identifying even first order intentionality in non-linguistic beings
is, however, a challenge.
Although there is a long tradition of examining goal-directed
behaviour in a range of species, e.g. [13,14], in the realm of
communication it was developmental psychologists working with
pre-linguistic infants who proposed an important set of behav-
ioural criteria for distinguishing intentional from reflexive gestural
signal production ([15], see Table 1). These criteria have since
been successfully applied to great ape gestural communication (as
reviewed in [16]). It is important to highlight that most of the
criteria developed to identify intentional signalling in preverbal
human infants and non-human primates (Table 1) do not
necessarily indicate first order rather than zero order intentional
signal production if applied in isolation: lower level and less
cognitive explanations for these behaviours are available. For
instance, audience effects could be mediated by differing arousal
levels caused by the presence of others (e.g. social facilitation), and
sensitivity to the attentional state of the recipient could represent a
learned discrimination (e.g. only signal when recipient’s face is
visible). Such lower-level explanations of associative learning or
emotional processes are often applied post-hoc to findings to refute
cognitive explanations of behaviour [17]. It is therefore important
to look for convergent evidence from multiple criteria before
evoking cognitive explanations of intentional signal production
[18].
Evidence from observations of conspecific interactions as well as
experiments where great apes produce signals to human exper-
imenters to request food have shown that great ape gestures can
meet all of these behavioural criteria for intentionality [19–36]. As
manual gestures are also considered, a priori, to be under
voluntary control [37], great ape gestures are routinely char-
acterised as intentional (e.g. [20–23,32–34,36]). The first order
intentionality shown in great ape gesture production is argued to
represent an important precursor to the second order intention-
ality required for language [12].
In contrast to great ape gestures, primate vocalisations have
been traditionally characterized as unintentional and emotionally
driven [12]. This apparent difference between the zero order and
first order intentionality underlying primate vocalizations and
great ape gestures has been used by some prominent researchers to
support arguments that language originated from a gestural, rather
Table 1. Criteria used for identifying intentional production of communicative signals, as outlined in the study of great ape
gestures [19–36].
Criteria Explanation
Social use The signal is directed at a recipient. This can be assessed at various levels:
1. Presence/absence audience effect: the signal is only produced in the presence of a recipient.
2. Composition of audience: the signal is only produced in the presence of certain recipients (e.g., kin, dominants, friends)
3. Behaviour of audience: signal production is contingent on the behaviour of the recipient
Sensitivity to attentional
state of recipient*
Visual signals are only produced in the field of view of recipients. If signaller does not have a recipient’s visual attention, tactile or auditory
signals should be produced. This can also be considered a level (3) audience effect.
Manipulation of attentional
state of recipient*
Before a visual signal is produced, attention-getting behaviours are directed towards a recipient who is not visually attending to the
signaller.
Audience checking and
gaze alternation
Signaller monitors the audience and visually orients towards the recipient before producing a signal. If a third entity is involved, gaze
alternation may occur between recipients and this entity.
Persistence or elaboration Goal-directed signalling shown by repetition of the same signal (persistence), or production of different signals (elaboration) until the
desired goal is met.
*indicates applicable only to visual signals and therefore not relevant for vocal production.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076674.t001
Intentional Alarm Calling in Chimpanzees
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 October 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e76674
than a vocal, system (e.g. [12,38–43]). It is, however, possible that
this apparent difference is due to the different approach, methods,
and study species that primate gesture and vocal researchers have
used [44]. In contrast to gestural research, intentionality has rarely
been the focus of primate vocal research, thus it is vital that
directly comparable evidence is gained to empirically test whether
great ape vocal production engages first order intentionality.
Although no previous study has systematically applied the set of
criteria used in gestural research to primate vocal production,
there is some evidence showing that primate vocal signals can
meet some of these criteria in isolation. A single study on Thomas
langur monkeys demonstrated the capacity for goal-directed vocal
production, as males persisted in alarm calling until all group
members had vocally responded [45]. A more substantive body of
evidence indicates that primate vocalizations are used socially, as
demonstrated by sensitivity to the audience on a number of levels.
Primates increase their vocal production in the presence of others
[46,47] especially kin [48] and important social partners [49,50].
Captive chimpanzees also modulate vocal and gestural production
as a function of the attentional state of a human they are begging
from [29,31]. In addition, there is growing evidence that primates
have voluntary control over the initiation of vocalisations. On a
behavioural level vocalisations can be suppressed (e.g. [51])and
selectively produced in highly specific social circumstances (e.g.
[52,53]) and a range of primates have been successfully
conditioned to produce vocalisations in response to arbitrary
stimuli, reviewed in [54]. On a neurological level, cortical
involvement in the production of vocalisations has also been
shown in chimpanzees [55] and monkeys [56], which implies vocal
production is influenced by cognitive processes.
Despite previous research showing that initiation of vocalisa-
tions may be voluntary and single markers of intentionality may be
present in primate vocal production, no previous study has tested
the production of chimpanzee vocal signals across multiple
markers of intentionality, in a comparable manner to chimpanzee
gestures. In this study, we investigated whether wild chimpanzees
of the Budongo Forest Reserve, Uganda, produced alarm calls in
an intentional manner when encountering a predator model, by
testing their vocal behaviour against multiple markers of first order
intentionality (Table 1). Chimpanzees produce a variety of graded
vocalizations in response to predators and in this study we
distinguished ‘soft huus’ (SH), ‘alarm huus’ (AH) and ‘waa barks’
(WB; see Fig. 1; Audio S1, S2, S3).
In order to test if these calls were produced with first order
rather than zero order intentionality, we presented focal individ-
uals with a moving python model both when alone and as part of a
social group and recorded their subsequent behaviour. We tested
their vocal behaviour against three different markers of intention-
ality: (i) social use, (ii) audience checking and gaze alternation, and
(iii) persistence (Table 1). If chimpanzees produced alarm calls
intentionally as recipient-directed signals, we first expected to find
that calls were used socially and we examined this on two different
levels: most simply we examined if alarm calls were only produced
in the presence of an audience. We then examined whether alarm
calls were indiscriminately produced in the presence of others, or
whether callers were sensitive to who was present and thus call
production was mediated by the arrival of specific individuals.
Secondly, if these calls were directed at others, we expected
individuals to visually monitor recipients and to look at them
before signalling. We also expected calls to be associated with gaze
alternation between recipients and the snake. Finally, if signallers
produced their calls with the goal of warning group members
about the snake rather than simply expressing their own fear we
expected to find that they persisted in calling until group members
were safe (physically distant to the danger or aware of the ambush
predator: Table 2).
Methods
Ethics Statement
The Ethical review board of the Department of Psychology at
the University of York approved the protocol for this experimental
field study with wild chimpanzees. Permits to conduct our work
with the chimpanzees at the Sonso field site of the Budongo
Conservation Field Station in Budongo Forest Reserve were
obtained from the Uganda National Council for Science and
Technology (NS263), the Uganda Wildlife Authority (RES50), and
the President’s Office.
Study Site
This study was conducted with the habituated Sonso chimpan-
zee community [57] of the Budongo Forest Reserve, Uganda
(1u359 and 1u559N and 31u089 and 31u429E), between January
2010 and December 2011. The Sonso study area of the Budongo
Forest Reserve contains a grid trail system consisting of
Figure 1. Example spectrographic representations of chimpan-
zee alarm calls. This Figure illustrates (A) Soft Huu (SH), (B) Alarm Huu
(AH) and (C) Waa Bark (WB) vocalizations. The x-axis represents time in
seconds, the y-axis frequency (KHz). The darkness of the image
represents the amount of acoustic energy present, or the amplitude
of the sound. SH are short (,100 ms), tonal, and low pitched
(,500 Hz), and usually have a low amplitude and little frequency
modulation (Audio S1). These soft calls are unlikely to be heard by
individuals further than 50 m from the call producer and are
comparable with the ‘huu vocalizations’ described by Goodall [11] as
well as the alert hoos reported in Crockford et al. [10]. AH are longer,
louder, higher pitched, and with more frequency modulation compared
to soft huus (Audio S2). These tonal calls are comparable with the ‘alarm
calls’ described in Slocombe and Zuberbu¨hler [72]. WB are loud, abrupt
sounds with a noisy spectral quality (Audio S3). They typically start with
a low frequency ‘w’ introduction at call onset, followed by considerable
frequency modulation in the subsequent higher frequency element
that can sound like an ‘aa’ ‘aow’ or ‘aoo’ sound to the human ear.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076674.g001
Intentional Alarm Calling in Chimpanzees
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 October 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e76674
maintained paths that segment the core home range of the Sonso
community into ,100*100 m blocks of forest. This grid system
was used for travel by researchers and often chimpanzees. In
January 2010, the community consisted of 73 individuals; 11 adult
males, 23 adult females, 3 sub-adult males, 11 sub-adult females
and 25 juveniles/infants. Adults were defined as individuals above
15 years of age, and sub-adults as individuals between 10 and 15
years and regularly seen without their mothers [57].
Experimental Design
Focal individuals were exposed to the snake in three different
social contexts: when (i) alone and when travelling with others as
either the (ii) front or (iii) back individual in the group (minimum
of 4 m between focal back individual and individual ahead of
them). Seven individuals completed all three of these conditions as
part of a within-subjects design, and six additional focal individuals
completed single trials. Focal individuals were exposed to the
snake at a naturalistic rate (see Supporting Information (SI), File
S1).
Experimental Protocol
Snake model. We manufactured a model of an African Rock
Python (Python sebae), a non-venomous but lethal ambush predator
that is common in the Budongo Forest, using the conserved skin of
a dead python donated to us by the Uganda Wildlife Education
Centre (UWEC). This snake had been brought to UWEC, after it
was accidently injured during grass cutting in the local area.
Despite treatment, the snake later died as a result of these injuries.
Transparent fishing line attached to the head of the python model
allowed us to move the model from a distance (see Fig. S1A in File
S1 for a picture of the snake model).
General trial procedure. When the focal chimpanzee was
travelling on a trail, two observers navigated ahead of this
individual and hid the snake model under a pile of local leaves and
bark just to side of the focal individual’s anticipated travelling
path. Figure 2 shows the relative position and roles of the four
observers in an experimental set up. Observers used Motorola
GP340 radios to coordinate actions. Once the target focal
individual was within a 2 m radius of the snake, Observer 1
pulled once on the fishing line, causing the snake to move about
20 cm and to reveal itself to the chimpanzee. Due to the moving
nature of the model, detection of the snake was immediate in all
trials, as indicated by head turning towards the snake as it moved
and subsequent startle responses of focal individuals. This
experimental setup allowed us to reveal the snake to specific focal
individuals and to leave the snake concealed if conditions changed
and a trial was no longer appropriate. Pulling the snake model
from under the leaves meant different amounts of the snake
became visible in each trial, avoiding habituation (see Fig. S1B in
File S1). Although this also meant the model varied in visual
saliency across trials, we found that the percentage of snake model
that was visible did not influence the likelihood of non-focal
Table 2. Behaviours continuously coded from when the snake was revealed to the end of the trial when the focal individual had
moved further than 10 m from the snake.
BEHAVIOUR CATEGORY SPECIFICATION
Focal proximity to the snake ,1 m, 1–5 m, 5–10 m, .10 m
Position of the focal Tree or Ground
Focal looking behaviour Look at snake, look at other chimp, look at distant calls, look elsewhere. Looking direction was based on
the head direction of the focal individual [21], which was observed from at least two different angles.
Real-time commentary of their head direction was used in conjunction with the videos to determine their
looking direction.
Focal Movement Approach snake, move away from snake, move towards other chimp, no movement
Focal alarm calls Soft Huu (SH), Alarm Huu (AH), Waa Bark (WB). Each call within a bout was coded as a point event.
Focal alarm calling bout Sequence of calls of the same type: SH bout, AH bout, WB bout. A new bout was defined as a call given
after 30 sec of silence or calls of a less ‘urgent’ type (SH,AH,WB) from the caller.
Non-focal calls No calls others, within group calls, distant calls
Approach of non-focal individual to the snake Non-focal individuals move towards the snake, no approach from non focal individuals
Risk assessment of non-focal individuals All non focal individuals in party are safe: safety was defined as (1) awareness of the ambush predator
(bipedal approach, visual searching of snake area, production of call) or (2) sufficient physical distance
from the predator to not be in danger (up a tree or .10 m from the snake).
At least one non-focal individual is in danger (not aware of ambush predator – no calls, bipedal approach
or visual searching of snake area and physical proximity to the snake ,10 m on the ground)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076674.t002
Figure 2. Diagram of the experimental set up. The snake image
represents the location of the python model, concealed by leaves not
depicted. Observers are depicted by grey asterisks and their main roles
defined. Observer 4 was optional in the set-up. The chimpanzee image
depicts the focal chimpanzee, who could be accompanied by other
group members depending on the experimental condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076674.g002
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individuals, who saw the static model, producing calls (for further
details, see File S1).
Behaviour Coding
The focal individual was filmed from a minimum of two
different angles. After thorough training, all observers gave reliable
real time commentary on the looking direction and vocal and anti-
predator behaviour (see Table 2) of the focal individual and other
group members present, either onto a video recorder or a
dictaphone (see File S1 for details on training and inter-observer
reliability tests). Observer 2 additionally sound recorded vocaliza-
tions with a Sennheiser ME67 microphone and Marantz PCM661
solid state recorder.
Video Coding
Video recordings were coded (see Table 2) and analysed using
the software package Observer XT 10.0 (Noldus Information
Technology, for more details see File S1). Video coding was
confirmed as accurate by an independent individual who coded all
categories of behaviour in Table 2 on 5/21 within subjects focal
trials (25%), resulting in a mean Cohen’s kappa coefficient of.72
(range = .69–.77).
In addition to the behaviours coded in Table 2, in each trial an
estimate of the percentage of the snake model uncovered was
recorded by AS, and in the majority of trials this was later verified
from photographs of the revealed snake model next to a scale
object (compass: see Fig. S1B in File S1). We also coded the timing
of the arrival of any new individuals who had not been in the focal
individual’s party (individuals within 30 m radius of the focal
individual; [49]) when the snake was revealed. At the point of an
arrival we identified any individual who had seen the moving or
static snake (videoed or commentated by observers to have
approached and visually fixated on the area containing the snake)
and was still in the party as a potential caller, who could produce
vocalizations to warn the new arrivals about the presence of the
snake. We characterized the relationship between the potential
callers and the arriving individuals first in terms of dominance [58]
and second in terms of an affiliative relationship or friendship (see
File S1 for calculations).
Calling Behaviour
There is a lack of clarity in how chimpanzee alarm calls have
been described and labelled in the literature. Crockford et al. [10]
discriminated between loud alarm barks and quiet ‘alert hoos’ but
did not provide spectrograms of the alert hoos commonly elicited
by their snake model. In this study, we distinguished three types of
alarm calls: ‘Soft Huus’ (SH), ‘Alarm Huus’ (AH), and ‘Waa Barks’
(WB; Fig. 1; Audio S1, S2, S3). Although these three call types
grade into each other (SH to AH to WB) it is possible to reliably
categorise this continuum into three discrete types. To ensure calls
were classified correctly, two expert chimpanzee vocal researchers,
AS (3 years experience) and KS (10 years experience) indepen-
dently classified all 1273 focal alarm-related calls that occurred
across trials. KS coded the calls blind to the trial type and other
behaviour coding. We obtained high agreement on the classifica-
tion of calls (Cohen’s Kappa= 0.87) and the 78 disagreements all
concerned calls from neighbouring classes (SH/AH disagree-
ment = 25; AH/WB disagreement = 53; SH/WB disagree-
ment = 0). KS and AS reviewed all 78 calls where there was
disagreement and reached a mutually agreed final classification for
these calls, resulting in a final set of 876 SH, 229 AH and 168 WB.
Observational Data Collection
We conducted focal follows of most adult and sub-adult
community members, including all the experimental focal subjects,
in order to collect observational data on their social relationships.
An average of 190.0 hours (min= 34.5; max=405.4; SD=112.9)
of focal data were collected on each experimental focal individual
over the study period. All occurrence grooming and aggressive
interactions involving the focal individual were recorded in
addition to 15 minute scans of their nearest neighbour (identity
and proximity) and the identity of all individuals within their party
(all individuals within a 30 m radius of the focal individual; [49]).
These data enabled us to calculate the direction (positive or
negative) and magnitude (strong or weak) of social relationships
between individuals in the community (for calculations, see File
S1). All occurrence pant-grunt vocalizations (call given by
subordinate individual to a dominant individual) were collected
in order to establish dominance hierarchies [58].
Operationalisation of Intentionality Criteria
In order to provide a direct comparison to chimpanzee gesture
findings, we tested chimpanzee alarm call production against
several markers of intentionality typically used in primate gesture
research (Table 1). We examined whether alarm calls were (i) used
socially by examining sensitivity to the presence or absence of an
audience and the composition of the audience; (ii) directed at
recipients by examining audience checking and gaze alternation
before and during calling; and (iii) goal directed by examining
whether callers persisted in vocal production until all group
members were safe from danger. We operationalised these criteria
to maximize the similarity with previous gesture work as detailed
below.
Social use: presence/absence of an audience. In line with
previous ape gesture studies (e.g. [26,27]) that examined signalling
in the presence and absence of an audience in order to establish
that the signals are communicative, we compared focal calling
behaviour in the alone and social group conditions. For this, we
used the 21 focal within subject trials (N=7 individuals, N= 3
trials (1 alone; 2 social) per individual). However, in three of the
seven focal alone trials, other individuals called or approached the
focal individual after the snake was revealed, providing the focal
individual with an audience and converting the trial into a social
trial. Thus, in order to compare vocal behaviour across the seven
individuals who completed both the alone and social conditions,
we had to examine the focal individual’s immediate response to
the snake. FK alone, MS alone, and RE alone trials became social
trials 8.24, 9.56 s and 36.76 s (mean 18.19 s) respectively after the
focal animal saw the moving snake. Thus, as the shortest alone
trial was 8.24 seconds, we focused the analyses on the immediate
response of the focal individual in the first 8.24 s of all within-
subjects trials, to determine if focal individuals took into account
the presence or absence of an audience when producing their calls.
Social use: composition of audience. In order to deter-
mine if chimpanzee alarm calls were mediated not only by the
presence of an audience but also the identity of individuals present,
we examined whether the arrival of dominant or important social
partners influenced the calling behaviour of both focal and non-
focal individuals who had seen either the moving or non-moving
snake model. For this, we examined all 27 trials and identified all
instances where the audience composition changed due to new
individuals joining the focal party after the snake had been
revealed (i.e. individuals who had not seen the snake and may or
may not have heard alarm calls before joining the party). We
examined the calling behaviour of all individuals who had seen the
snake in the 30 seconds before and after the arrival of new
Intentional Alarm Calling in Chimpanzees
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individuals. We assessed whether call rates increased in response to
arrivals and if so whether the identity of the individual arriving
mediated the change in calling behaviour. This would indicate
that the calls were not only communicative but may have been
directed at specific members of the audience. As an alternative
explanation we also examined factors that were related to the
caller’s own danger levels and proximity to the snake, which may
indicate calls were an individualistic expression of emotion (zero
order intentionality) rather than signals directed at others.
Social trials. The remaining intentionality criteria (audience
checking, gaze alternation and persistence) all require a social
audience. For the analyses that follow we thus examined the
behaviour of the focal individual in the 22 trials where a social
audience was present at some stage (5 alone trials where no other
individuals arrived were excluded). For 19 trials where a social
audience was present from the moment of snake discovery, the
whole experimental trial was considered, but as MS, FK and RE
alone trials only became social (other individuals arriving or
because of out of sight individuals calling) at 9.56 s, 8.24 s and
36.76 sec after the snake was discovered, for these trials we only
considered the focal animal’s behaviour after these periods once a
social audience was present.
Audience checking. In line with Hobaiter and Byrne [23] we
examined whether the signaller showed awareness of potential
recipients and looked at the recipient(s) before signalling. We
examined whether, in the 5 sec period before producing a new call
bout, the focal individual looked at the snake (0 = no; 1 = yes), at
another visible chimpanzee in the party (0/1), or at any visible or
out of sight, but calling individual (0/1). It was important to
consider individuals out of sight, because vocalizations, in contrast
to visual gestures, can be directed to any member of the auditory
audience (i.e. all those in hearing range of the call), regardless of
whether they are visible or not.
Gaze alternation. For all social trials, we identified whether
gaze alternation between a social partner and the snake occurred
during the focal individual’s production of snake alarm calls. For
this, we followed Leavens et al. [27] and Leavens and Hopkins
[28] and identified gaze alternations (i.e. the focal individual looks
successively from snake to chimpanzee or vice versa) that did and
did not accompany calling behaviour. Gaze alternation is a
measure that identifies whether the signaller checks the behaviour
and attentional state of its recipient when communicating [28],
and may even be used to communicate about an external entity
[28]. As many chimpanzees approached the snake silently, but
engaged in behaviours that indicated awareness of the danger (e.g.
bipedal stance, visual scanning of the snake area), attending to the
behaviour of other chimpanzees through visual checking and gaze
alternation is likely important for callers. Therefore, if calling was
mediated by the behaviour of others and others’ awareness of the
danger, we would expect to see gaze alternation accompanying
calling.
Leavens et al. [27] identified cases of gaze alternation that
occurred during pointing gestures (mean duration 4.9 s) as a
marker of intentionality. However, as alarm calls were consider-
ably shorter in duration than pointing gestures, we could not
examine gaze alternations that occurred within these signals.
Instead, we looked for gaze alternation events where calls occurred
within 3 seconds of the change in gaze focus (e.g. within a 6 sec
period surrounding the switch in visual gaze between the snake
and social partner). All gaze alternation events were thus
categorized as gaze alternations with calls, or gaze alternations
without calls.
To determine if gaze alternations were communicative we
calculated rates of gaze alternations with calls (Gaze alternations
with calls/duration focal calling bouts in trial) and without calls
(Gaze alternations without calls/duration of trial without focal
calling bouts). For each individual we assessed if their rate of gaze
alternation was higher with or without calls.
To determine whether gaze alternations were produced more
often with certain call types, we first determined the type of call
associated with each gaze alternation with calls (N= 76) using
standardized rules (see File S1). We then determined for all call
bouts whether or not the focal individual produced at least one
gaze alternation event associated with the relevant call type during
the bout (e.g. for each SH bout we looked for the occurrence of at
least one gaze alternation associated with SH).
Persistence: goal directed behaviour. In line with previous
gesture studies [19,30], we took the repetition of signals until a goal
is met as a marker of intentionality and goal-directed behaviour.
Identifying the conditions that are associated with the cessation of
signalling is important in order to infer the goal of a signal
sequence. Within calling bouts, chimpanzee alarm calls are
commonly repeated in sequences, with our data revealing a mean
duration of 2.49 s (SD=3.4 s) between individual calls, which is
comparable to repetition rates observed in gesture sequences [32].
We hypothesized that the goal of alarm calls was to warn others of
danger and we therefore tested whether focal chimpanzees
persisted in producing alarm calls until all others in the vicinity
of the snake were safe (either due to sufficient physical distance
[.10 m away, up a tree] or aware of this ambush predator -
[produced calls, approached bipedally or visually scanned the area
containing the snake]; See Table 2). More specifically, we
examined if others in the vicinity were more likely to be safe in
the 10 s after the last call in a bout was produced compared to the
rest of the trial (defined as period from snake exposure to when the
focal individual moved more than 10 m from the snake), excluding
the 10 s periods associated with the stopping of calling. We took
behaviour in the rest of the trial period to be indicative of a
‘chance’ level of a particular behaviour occurring in this predatory
context. The end of a calling bout was defined by the last call
before a period of at least 30 sec silence. In order to test an
alternative hypothesis that alarm calls were a reflection of the
perceived level of threat to the caller, rather than a recipient-
directed signal, we also tested whether the caller was more likely to
have started moving away from the snake and thus reduced his
own risk level as he stopped calling, compared to the rest of the
trial.
Statistics
Generalized Linear Mixed effects Models (GLMMs) with a
binomial error structure were used to investigate the influence of
continuous or categorical explanatory variables (e.g. distance to
snake, higher ranking individual present) on a binary response
variable (e.g. call or not). Furthermore, because we had repeated
sampling from the same individual due to both multiple calling
bouts within an experiment and multiple experiments on some
individuals we fitted ‘‘individual’’ and ‘‘experiment’’ as random
factors [59] by conducting random intercepts models using the
package lme4 [60]. When investigating the influence of multiple
fixed explanatory factors we used Akaike’s Information Criterion
(AIC) to select the most parsimonious model. Lower AIC values
indicate improved support for each model [61,62] with terms
considered to improve the fit only if their exclusion from the model
inflated the AIC value by more than two units [63]. To assess the
significance of explanatory variables, we returned each variable
one at a time and compared this to a null model, comprising only
the intercept and random effects, using a likelihood ratio test [64].
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Models were implemented in R v. 2.12 and alpha values were set
at 0.05.
In addition, we performed simple within-subjects non-paramet-
ric tests to establish if calling behaviour varied across the three
different conditions that seven focal chimpanzees experienced. We
also conducted One sample Wilcoxon signed Ranks tests (non-
parametric equivalent to one-sample t-test used due to skew in
data set) to establish if the behaviour observed in the 10 second
period associated with stopping calling (e.g. 10 s after the last call
in a bout) was significantly different from behaviour in the rest of
the trial (chance level of that behaviour occurring). To avoid
pseudo-replication, for each individual we calculated mean values
for the behaviours of interest in the two time periods across all
their social trials. These statistical tests were conducted using
PASW 18 software and all tests were 2-tailed.
Results
Social Use: Presence/Absence of an Audience
We investigated whether calls were directed at recipients and
therefore only produced in the presence of an audience, by
comparing the calling behaviour of seven focal individuals who
had each discovered the moving snake in one alone and two social
contexts (N= 21 trials). We found that only soft huus (SH) were
produced as an immediate response (within the first 8.24 s) to
snake discovery in a sufficient number of trials (16/21) to enable
statistical analysis. For this call type, our results showed that calls
were produced irrespective of the presence of an audience,
indicating these calls were not directed at conspecifics. More
specifically, in the first 8.24 s after snake exposure, six of the seven
individuals produced SH in at least one of the social conditions (6/
7 in front; 5/7 in back) and five of the seven individuals also
produced SH in the alone condition. A Friedman test revealed no
difference in the number of SH given in this time period across the
three trial types (X2(2) = 1.52, p = .531). A very similar pattern was
found when considering the focal animals’ responses over a longer
time period (see File S1). An additional two chimpanzees
completed alone trials, and both of these individuals produced
SH within 8.24 s of encountering the snake, confirming the
pattern that SH are produced in both the presence and absence of
an audience. In immediate response to the snake (within 8.24 s),
AH were produced in only one alone condition and WB were
produced in only one social (back) condition.
When taking into account the complete duration of the within
subject trials, AH were produced by focal individuals in 9/21
trials, after an average latency of 61.86 s (range 6.76–170.76 s,
SD=63.73) from snake discovery. WB were produced by focal
individuals in 7/21 trials, after an average latency of 52.94 s (range
5.52–123.82, S.D. = 49.06) from snake discovery. In contrast,
when taking into account the complete duration of the trials, SH
were produced in 20/21 trials, after an average latency of 7.60 s
(range 1.77–50.36 s, SD=9.85) from snake discovery (see Video
S1).
Social Use: Composition of Audience
To assess if call production was mediated by the composition of
the audience, we identified instances where the audience
composition changed due to new individuals joining the focal
party after the snake had been revealed. For this, we considered
data from focal and non-focal individuals from all 27 trials and
found we could accurately determine the timing of 39 arrival
events across 9 trials, where a new individual joined the focal
party. These individuals arrived on average 9.88 minutes
(SD=8.68 min) after the snake was revealed (range= 1.05–
28.98 min). Across trials, we identified 14 different individuals
who were in a position to act as callers in one or more arrival
events: these were individuals who had seen the snake before the
new individuals arrived and therefore had the opportunity to
increase their calling in response to a newly arriving individual. In
total, we identified 87 dyads of potential callers and newly arriving
individuals. For each potential caller in a dyad, we determined
whether or not their SH, AH and WB production increased in the
30 seconds after an arrival compared with 30 seconds prior to an
arrival.
Potential callers increased their SH production in 2/87 dyads in
the 30 seconds after a new individual arrived in the party. This
implies that SH production is not mediated by the arrival of new
individuals and there was insufficient variability in the data to
statistically investigate this further. In contrast, potential callers
increased both AH and WB production in 9/87 dyads in the 30 s
after new individuals arrived compared to the 30 s before they
arrived. There was sufficient variability in these data to investigate
whether an increase in both AH and WB production was
mediated by social factors, such as the identity of the newly
arriving individual, or rather by the potential caller’s own position
relative to the snake. A GLMM with a binomial error structure
was implemented, with increase in both AH and WB production
(0/1) as the dependent binary variable and individual and
experiment entered as random factors. As independent variables,
we included an index value for the presumed ‘friendship’ between
the potential caller and the newly arriving individual (see File S1),
their dominance relation (see File S1), the potential caller’s
absolute distance to the snake, and whether he or she was closest to
the snake relative to others. The GLMM revealed that an increase
in AH and WB production was significantly mediated by the
friendship between the potential caller and the arriving individual,
with the arrival of friends more likely to be associated with an
increase in calling (X2 (1) = 9.68; p= 0.002). In contrast, although
potential callers appeared more likely to increase AH and WB
production to the arrival of an individual who was dominant to
them, this trend was not significant (X2 (1) = 2.89; p = 0.089). In
terms of the potential callers’ own position relative to the snake we
found that there was a non significant trend for individuals to
increase AH and WB production in response to others arriving if
the callers were the closest individual to the snake (X2 (1) =22.92,
p = 0.088), however, callers’ absolute proximity to the snake did
not influence their AH and WB production (X2 (1) = 0.01,
p = 0.923).
Audience Checking
To further assess if chimpanzees were aware of their audience
and directed alarm calls at others, we examined the focal animal’s
gaze orientation in the 5 seconds before starting a new call bout
(see Table 2 for definition). For this, we only used focal data from
trials or parts of trials where a social audience (visible or in
auditory contact) was present (total of 22 trials from 12 focal
individuals). We predicted that, if calls were directed towards
others, the caller should look to the intended recipient(s) prior to
starting a call bout. We coded whether, in the 5 s period before a
new call bout, the focal individual looked at the snake (0/1), at
another visible chimpanzee in the party (0/1), or at any visible or
out of sight, but calling individual (0/1). We ran three separate
GLMM’s with binomial error structures to investigate whether the
variation in gaze orientation at the three targets 5 s before the start
of a call bout could be explained by the call type following it (SH,
AH, WB). We identified a total of 49 cases from 12 individuals
over 22 trials where we could accurately code gaze orientation 5 s
before the start of the new calling bouts. We found a non
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significant trend for chimpanzees to be more likely to look at the
snake before making a SH than an AH or WB (X2 (2) = 5.46;
p = 0.065). In contrast, we found that call type explained a
significant amount of variation in gaze orientation towards other
chimpanzees (X2 (2) = 10.21; p = 0.006): chimpanzees were more
likely to look at another chimpanzee in the 5 s before producing
AH or WB compared to SH bouts (see Fig. 3). As receivers of vocal
signals can be out of sight, we also examined cases where
chimpanzees oriented towards the location of non-visible individ-
uals (identified by their calls). In line with the previous result, we
found that call type explained a significant amount of the variation
regarding whether the focal individual oriented his attention
towards visible or auditory conspecific targets 5 s before starting a
call bout (X2 (2) = 15.42; p,0.001). Again the focal individual was
more likely to attend to social stimuli before producing an AH or
WB bout than a SH bout. Video S1, Video S2 and Figure S2 in
File S1 together illustrate an example trial where an adult female
looked at the snake before and during production of a SH bout,
but looked at another individual before beginning a WB bout.
Gaze Alternation
As a further marker of calls being directed at recipients and
callers monitoring the behaviour of others, we examined whether
chimpanzees accompanied their vocal signals with gaze alterna-
tion between recipients and the snake. For this, we only used focal
data from trials or parts of trials where a visible social audience
was present (total of 21 trials from 12 focal individuals). Nine out
of twelve focal individuals (75%) who had seen the moving snake
showed gaze alternation with calling (see Video S2). Eight of these
nine chimpanzees alternated their gaze between the snake and
another chimpanzee at a significantly higher rate during calling
bouts (median= .029 gaze alternations/s; IQR= .035) than when
they were not calling (median = .006 gaze alternations/s;
IQR= .020; two-tailed sign test, p = .020).
Overall, gaze alternation was associated with 15/38 (39%) SH
bouts, 3/13 (23%) AH bouts and 4/11 (36%) WB bouts. A
GLMM confirmed that call bout type did not explain a significant
amount of variation in the occurrence of gaze alternation (X2
(2) = 1.24, p = 0.538).
Persistence: Is Signalling Goal Directed?
In order to identify the ‘stopping rules’ for call production and
to test the hypothesis that individuals persist in calling until their
goal of warning others about danger is met, we compared the
behaviour of callers and recipients in the 10 s after the last call in a
calling bout (stopped calling) with behaviour during the rest of the
trial. For this, we used focal data from trials or parts of trials where
a visible social audience was present, and where the focal
individuals were still present within 10 m of the snake when they
stopped their calling bouts (total of 19 trials from 11 focal
individuals). A one sample Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that
a decrease in the caller’s own risk did not explain their decision to
stop calling, as callers were not more likely to be moving away
from the snake as they stopped calling than in the rest of the trial
(z = 1.07, N= 11, p= .284). Rather, it appeared that a decrease in
other individuals’ risk explained the callers’ decisions to stop
calling: when callers stopped calling, it was significantly more likely
that all recipients were safe (aware of snake, more than 10 m away
from it, or up in a tree; Table 2) compared to chance
(median= 100.00% vs. 40.42%; z= 2.54, N=11, p = .011). These
analyses indicate that the goal of calling could be to warn others of
danger, as it is a decrease in the risk of others, not the caller, which
seems to mediate the decision to stop calling.
Discussion
The results of our study demonstrate that some chimpanzee
alarm calls show numerous hallmarks of intentional communica-
tion. Similar to chimpanzee gestures, WB and AH were produced
socially in the presence of socially important individuals:
chimpanzees who had seen the snake were more likely to increase
their production of WB and AH to the arrival of a friend than a
non-friend and there was a trend for increased calling when a
more dominant individual arrived. Thus chimpanzees seem to
produce these calls tactically and target important individuals who
are valuable to them. This is in line with two previous studies,
reporting that chimpanzees were more likely to produce alert hoos
in the presence of social bond partners [10] and more likely to
produce food-associated calls when a dominant friend arrived in
the vicinity of their feeding tree compared to other types of
individuals [52]. Similar to Crockford et al. [10], we found little
evidence that calling was a reflection of the caller’s own risk (zero-
order intentionality), as calling was not related to the callers’
absolute distance from the snake. Instead, the production of AH
and WB calls seemed to be recipient focussed. Interestingly, there
was a trend for chimpanzees to increase alarm calling if they were
the closest individual to the snake when a new individual arrived.
Again, this finding is in line with Crockford et al. [10], indicating
that the individual closest to the danger may perform a form of
sentinel duty. In addition, our study is the first to demonstrate that
the production of WB and AH calls was often preceded by visual
checking of the audience, accompanied with gaze alternations, and
individuals were likely to persist in producing calls until all group
members were safe from the ambush predator.
We interpret these patterns as evidence that chimpanzee alarm
calling meets the key diagnostic features of intentional signal
production. Although each of these behaviours can be explained
separately as the product of less complex cognitive processes, the
combined overall pattern is more consistent with the hypothesis
that call production is both socially directed and goal-directed.
Furthermore, following previous gesture work where the produc-
tion of manual signals in concurrence with these markers of
intentionality has been taken as evidence for (first order)
intentional communication, we suggest that these two chimpanzee
alarm call types qualify as intentional signals.
The debate as to how well behavioural markers can distinguish
between first-order and zero-order intentionality in relation to
signalling will continue. However, a key point of our results is that
chimpanzee vocalizations meet the same basic criteria for
Figure 3. Percentage of cases (raw data) where a look to
another chimpanzee was present/absent in the 5 sec before a
new call bout as a function of the type of call then given.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076674.g003
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intentional signal usage which have been put forward for great ape
and human infant gestures. At the same time, our results are
inconsistent with the traditional notion of primate vocalizations
being reflexively and unintentionally produced. We thus argue
that our results undermine a key line of argument for gestural
theories of language evolution and highlight the need for care in
interpreting and comparing primate communication data from
different communicative modalities [44]. In contrast to gestural
research that has mainly focused on great apes, in the vocal
domain monkey species have been the predominant subject of
research [44] and studies have indicated that some of their calls
are not directed at others, but are instead a reflection of the
internal state of the caller [6,65] and indicative of zero order
intentionality. Proponents of gestural theories of language
evolution have commonly taken these findings as representative
of primate vocal communication as a whole, but our results show
that generalizing findings from monkey species to great apes may
not be valid. This study complements a growing body of evidence
showing similarities in the proximate mechanisms driving the
production of both great ape vocalisations and gestures and
indicating that both modalities are characterised by voluntary
control and flexible, intentional use of signals [19–36]. This
indicates that rather than having an exclusively gestural or vocal
origin, language may have originated from a multimodal
communication system, containing both gestural and vocal signals
[18,55].
In contrast to the WB and AH, we found mixed support for SH
being produced intentionally. SH tended to be given in immediate
response to the discovery of the moving snake model, regardless of
whether or not there was a conspecific audience. In addition, SH
production very rarely increased in response to the arrival of new
individuals and callers were significantly less likely to monitor or
check the audience before starting a SH calling bout than an AH
or WB bout. Thus, at least in immediate responses to a moving
snake, SH calls do not seem to be directed at others in an
intentional way and may thus be interpreted as the product of
zero-order intentionality. SH did, however, still meet some of the
markers of intentional signalling as they were accompanied by
gaze alternation and they contributed to the finding that
individuals were likely to persist in calling until all group members
were safe. One possible explanation for this mixed pattern of
results is that initially upon discovery of a predator, these calls are
part of a relatively involuntary startle response and may represent
an individualistic expression of fear towards a salient moving snake
model [66,67]. It is possible, however, that the same calls are used
in a more recipient directed and intentional manner later in the
trial, after the initial startle response and peak of arousal associated
with discovery of the predator has dissipated. In contrast to
Crockford et al. [10] we used a moving snake model manufac-
tured from real python skin, rather than a static papier-maˆche´
model, suggesting that we triggered more powerful startle
responses, which may have required longer recovery times before
individuals regained voluntary control over their call production.
One outstanding issue concerns the motivation underlying WB
and AH production. It is possible that chimpanzees have a selfish
motivation and call to recruit others in order to obtain support or
comfort in a stressful and dangerous situation. If this is the case,
then these vocalizations are functioning in a similar manner to
many great ape gestures in that they are an imperative request for
action in others [20,68]. However, given the context-specific
nature of many primate alarm calls [69–71] these signals could
also be produced with an intention to benefit others by providing
information about a specific danger. Indeed, our finding that
calling is more likely to stop when all individuals are safe indicates
that the goal of callers may be to warn others of the danger; a
potential case of intentional referential communication.
In conclusion, chimpanzee alarm call production meets some of
the key hallmarks of intentional signal production in a directly
comparable way to chimpanzee gestures. We have shown that AH
and WB production is sensitive to the composition of the audience
and that these calls are directed at specific individuals and goal-
directed. We therefore conclude that some chimpanzee vocal
signals qualify as intentional signals, in contrast to the traditional
characterisation of great ape vocal behaviour as an inflexible,
reflexive, involuntary, zero-order intentional process [12]. We
believe that our findings are inconsistent with central arguments of
gestural theories of language origins and instead support a
multimodal origin for human language.
Supporting Information
File S1 Supplementary information including supple-
mentary methods, results, figures, video legends and
audio file legends.
(DOC)
Video S1 Video illustrating discovery of the moving
snake and soft huu production. Video is filmed from position
1 illustrated in Figure S2 in File S1. Focal adult female, Nambi
produces a startle response and then begins producing soft huus
(commentated by the observer as ‘huuing’) and visually examining
the snake, from a bipedal stance. Nambi’s gaze remains fixated on
the snake during the soft huu production.
(AVI)
Video S2 Video illustrating gaze alternation and look-
ing at a group member before producing waa barks.
Video is filmed from position 2 illustrated in Figure S2 in File S1.
Focal adult female Nambi reacts to the arrival of her adult son
Musa by turning and looking at Musa before producing her first
waa barks of the trial. Nambi then looks immediately back at the
snake, showing gaze alternation between the recipient and the
snake whilst calling. During Nambi’s waa bark production, Musa
stands bipedally.
(AVI)
Audio S1 Sound recording of an example Soft Hoo (SH).
(WAV)
Audio S2 Sound recording of an example Alarm Hoo
(AH).
(WAV)
Audio S3 Sound recording of an example Waa Bark
(WB).
(WAV)
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